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Witty Worm Insider? Perhaps not.

In several discussions around the net it has been suggested that the author of the Witty Worm must be an insider. I'm not so sure. Although I agree that it's interesting that the worm was pre-populated with a seed target list, and also interesting that some of those hosts were on a military base, I'm not convinced of the conclusions that others have drawn from these facts, namely that the attacker had to be an insider -- either from the product vendor, or from the company who reported the defect. Likewise, the implication that the attack was directed at the US Military doesn't make sense. A few minutes of scanning could have produced a list of 100 vulnerable hosts. The scanning algorithm might have been something like this: google to find likely customers of the company whose product will be exploited, find address blocks likely to be associated with those clients using various DNS tools, scan randomly until you find a vulnerable host, then walk up and down from tha...

Device Drivers: a hidden worm threat?

One of the more interesting security articles of late, Device drivers filled with flaws, threaten security from Security Focus , discusses the potential for device drivers to be exploited, due to many lurking buffer overflow defects. The article discusses Windows and Linux as examples, although presumably any platform which depends upon many 3rd party device drivers could be subject to the same issues. Drivers that listen on a network, such as network card drivers, would of course be vulnerable to remote exploits. People tend to think of device drivers as part of "the system", and the article points out that many if not most of the drivers people use are created by 3rd parties, not by the vendor of the operating system, and typically not by the core kernel developers. The article mentions that the authors of device drivers tend to have wildly varying skill levels, and that many drivers amongst a sample inspected appear not to be properly reviewed for security implicati...

The Next Big Worm

A systems administrator at a University pondered today, "We haven't seen a really big outbreak for a few months, where are the big worms these days, like Sasser and Blaster? Aren't there any big security holes left to exploit?" Oh, yes. Microsoft releases patches about once a month, and at any given time there are usually a few serious defects that are known, not widely patched, and remotely exploitable. So what's the deal? Worm authorship seems to be more about building and maintaining botnets for revenue generating spam networks, and mining for various data like email addresses, account names and passwords, and the like. Giant worm outbreaks that infect millions of machines work against the aims of this organized criminal activity. Widespread outbreaks get the instant attention of company management, systems administrators, and AntiVirus vendors worldwide. Many small outbreaks, exploiting older known defects don't attract so much attention and serve ...

Clear Thinking & Information Security

I noticed one day in a discussion with a client, that something they said resonated with things other clients have said over the years. Literally some dozens of conversations over the years have gone something like this: So, you plan to re-install the worm infected systems from clean media, right? No. We get hit by viruses all the time and nothing really bad has ever happened. We'll just delete the worm files, whack the key from the registry and go back about our business. Do you know what the worm did after it contacted the overseas IRC remote control channel? No. How do you know nothing bad happened? If you're a client and you recognize this conversation, don't feel bad, I'm not quoting you. I've had this same basic conversation with many other clients, you're in good company (I'm not quoting them, either!) Just about every other professional consultant in the information security world that I've ever spoken with has similar "war s...

If it's on your image, you must patch it

Patches were released and risk assessment on Microsoft Internet Explorer vulnerabilities was requested. I'm sorry to report that risk assessment of this particular type is rather simple. I can describe it in three steps. (1) The risk of the vulnerability being exploited is real, and high. The nature of the vulnerability itself doesn't much factor into the assessment. What matters most is how many systems do you have running the software with the vulnerability, and how important are those systems. If history is any guide, these vulnerabilities will be exploited by dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of variants of malware, over the next days, weeks, and months. Recently announced vulnerabilities affecting the Microsoft Internet Explorer can be used to install and execute software on the system, when that system has accessed a malicious or benevolent-but-compromised web site. Vulnerabilities like this one have been exploited by literally hundreds of bits of malware i...

Slow Scanners & Sniffer worms

The discovery of the W32/Sdbot-UJ worm, which employed the technique of network sniffing, has shone a bit of light on a dark corner of the worm universe. W32/Sdbot-UJ has sometimes been reported as the first worm to perform network sniffing, but almost certainly it was not. It may have been the first such to be captured and analyzed by an AntiVirus vendor, I don't know. This worm employs a technique thought for years by some security professionals to be used by "slow scanners". I say "thought to be used" because it turns out this particular class of worms is difficult to study and not perceived universally as much of a threat. Some professionals even dispute whether Slow Scanners exist, yet. (Everyone seems to agree that if they don't, they will soon enough.) Slow Scanner worms are not widely reported in the media, partly because they are not as flashy as the worms that hit millions of machines in a day and whose propagation efforts are so aggressiv...

Exploit Chaining: Virus, Worm, and Malware Evolution

All y'all might be interested in these articles. I've slogged through hundreds in the last week of evenings, and these are some of the most interesting. The first few regard using Internet Explorer features and defects for installation of trojans. With last Tuesday's release of several new Windows and IE vulnerabilities, it became clear that it was possible to chain together remote-non-root exploits and local-root-exploits, to gain Administrator access on a Windows system remotely, though indirectly. It seemed to me at the time that this would be somewhat complicated and we probably wouldn't see these types of exploits until the universe had harvested the low-hanging-fruit of remote-root exploits. After reading up a bunch this week (someday there will be pop music bemoaning the lonely nights spent with google...) I'm revising that opinion. There already exist documented examples of complex MSIE-exploit-chaining malware in the world, so we can expect to see mo...